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LEGISLATIVE DELEGATION HELD UNCONSTITUTIONAL
BY FEDERAL COURT
Pan American Standard Brands, Inc. v. United States
177 F. Supp. 769 (Cust. Ct. 3d Div. 1959)
The legislature of Puerto Rico, pursuant to power delegated by Con-
gress,' declared tariff rates on coffee in 1935.2 This declaration was amended
in 1955 by an authorization to the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce
of Puerto Rico to increase or reduce the existing rates for certain purposes.3
The Secretary held a public hearing and, in a resolution approved by the
Governor, doubled the rates. Plaintiffs, having been assessed the higher rates,
contested the constitutionality of the delegation to the Secretary. The
Customs Court held the delegation unconstitutional.
The court was confronted with a problem of standards in legislative
delegation. The finding of unconstitutionality is based solely upon what the
court terms "an unbridled discretion to fix rates of duty on imported
coffee . . . ,"4 considering the standards of the statute insufficient.
The United States Supreme Court, as early as 1892,5 has repeatedly
stated that statutory standards are necessary to validate the delegation of
legislative authority. 6 However, the term "standards" has been considerably
broadened, until today an "intelligible principle" is considered sufficient.7
The adequacy of the standards involved, under such a flexible criterion, de-
pends upon a number of factors, including: (1) the scope of the power in-
volved,8 (2) the practicability of Congress' laying down precise standards,9
(3) the peculiar suitability of the problem involved to the legislative or the
administrative process, 10 (4) procedural safeguards against abuse of discre-
1 Tariff Act of 1939 § 319, 46 Stat. 696, 19 U.S.C.A. § 1319 (1960).
2 13 P.R. Laws. Ann. § 2201.
3 Ibid., Amount of duty; definition: ... Provided, That when market conditions
may warrant it and for the purpose of protecting the consumer or the coffee industry,
the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce is hereby authorized, until June 30, 1958,
to increase or reduce the duty levied by sections 2201-2205 of this title, after a public
hearing to that effect. The reduction or increase determined by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Commerce shall be subject to the approval of the Governor. Every
resolution increasing or reducing the duty levied shall be accompanied by a statement
concerning the considerations borne in mind for making the change; . . ."
4 Pan American Standard Brands, Inc. v. United States, 177 F. Supp. 769, 775
(Cust. Ct. 3d Div. 1959).
5 Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892).
6 See Davis, Administrative Law § 2.02 (1958).
7 American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 105 (1946); Hampton, Jr. &
Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928).
8 Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
9 Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952); NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190
(1943); Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470, 496 (1904).
10 Carlson v. Landon, supra note 9.
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tion," and (5) the inclusion of penal provisions in the subject matter of the
delegation. 12 These are "interlocking" factors in that the strong presence of
one may make up for the absence of others. As with many other problems
of constitutional law, the process of decision becomes a weighing and balanc-
ing process. Where precise standards have been impractical and the problem
involved is peculiarly suited to administrative determination, the Supreme
Court has not hesitated to uphold vague delegations.'" It is difficult to
determine the "upper limit," however, due to case-to-case variance in the
factors noted. This limit, of course, must be drawn somewhere short of the
delegation in Schecter Poultry Co. v. United States,' 4 where the scope of the
delegation overshadowed factors in favor of constitutionality.
In only two cases, both in 1935, has the Supreme Court actually over-
turned delegations to public authorities on the basis of inadequate stand-
ards.15 The two cases have been explained away by most writers upon con-
sideration of the times, the membership of the court, and the tremendous
scope of the delegated power in the Schecter case. 16 While both decisions
used language requiring precise legislative "guidelines," no commentator
has been found who cites this as a true ground of the decisions. One well-
recognized authority doubts that either decision is of more than questionable
authority today.'7 In fact, the Supreme Court has reversed the only decision
following the two cases which has reached the Court.' 8
The Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan and Schecter cases are not cited as
authority by the Customs Court, which bases its argument upon a com-
parison of the language of the Puerto Rican statute with the language in-
volved in some eight cases which have upheld delegations.' 9 The Court
argues that those cases are determinative of boundaries of permissable
11 United States v. Rock Royal Co-operatives, 307 U.S. 533 (1939); Panama Re-
fining Co. v. Ryan, supra note 8.
12 Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947).
13 E.g., NBC v. United States, supra note 9; United States v. Rock Royal Co-
operatives, supra note 11. See Davis, Administrative Law § 2.04 (1958), where the
author contends that delegations with no standards have been upheld, citing Fahey v.
Mallonee, supra note 12; McKinley v. United States, 249 U.S. 397 (1919); St. Louis,
I. M. & S. R. R. v. Taylor, 210 U.S. 281 (1908).
14 Schecter Poultry Co. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (discussed infra).
15 Ibid.; Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 288 (1935).
16 Davis, Administrative Law § 2.06 (1958); Jaffe, "An Essay on Delegation of
Legislative Power," 47 Col. L. Rev. 359, 561 (1947).
17 Davis, Administrative Law § 2.06 (1958).
18 Mallonee v. Fahey, 68 F. Supp. 418 (S.D. Cal. 1946), reversed, Fahey v. Mal-
lonee, supra note 12.
19 Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742 (1948); Bowles v. Williamson, 321 U.S.
503 (1944); Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944); New York Central Securities
Corp. v. United States, 287 U.S. 12 (1932); Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, supra
note 7; Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892); Alaska Steamship Co. v. Mulaney,




delegation, 20 and proceeds to distinguish each from the language before
the court on a narrow semantic basis. Phrases such as "fair and equitable
. . . promote the purposes of the Act,"2 ' were considered less vague than
"when market conditions warrant it . . . for the purpose of protecting the
consumer or the coffee industry."22 The court distinguishes the former word-
ing on the basis of its interpretation in light of surrounding conditions, but
never investigates the conditions surrounding the delegation in question.
The Act calls for a determination of times for rate adjustment and of the
effects of those adjustments upon consumers or the coffee industry. This
would seem to be a matter requiring the application of expert knowledge
and a matter suited to the administrative process, especially under an act
obviously contemplating a balancing of interests between consumers and the
industry.2 3 Quick action in changing rates may be required-quick action
which the legislature is normally unable to take-in keeping pace with
volatile market conditions. The court also fails to note the administrative
safeguards included within the amendment-the requirement of the Gov-
ernor's approval and the requirement of a statement of considerations 24 -
and provisions providing for judicial review.25
It is difficult to visualize an affirmance of this decision. No express
authority is cited. Indeed the only express authority available is that of the
Panama Refining and Schecter cases, and the Supreme Court has already
shown its willingness to ignore these decisions.20 The negative authority
cited by the court is not persuasive. While it is possible to draw fine distinc-
tions between the words of the various delegations, these are meaningless.
The grants involved in most of the cases cited are just as broad, if not
broader, than the grant in question. More importantly, the court failed to
go through the balancing process noted before, and indeed failed to take into
consideration the surrounding factors which have been relied upon by the
Supreme Court in its decisions.
As a matter of policy, this decision should not stand. "Delegation by
(the legislative branch) has long been recognized as necessary in order that
the exertion of legislative power does not become a futility.12 7 Consideration
of only the words used in establishing standards, and the consequent failure
20 "The Acts of Congress to which we have adverted demonstrate the boundaries
which have been attached to the exercise of the delegation of power to alter tariff
rates." 177 F. Supp. at 778.
21 Yakus v. United States, supra note 19.
22 177 F. Supp. at 777.
23 A similar balancing of interests was involved in the delegation upheld by the
Supreme Court in the Rock Royal case. United States v. Rock Royal Co-operatives,
supra note 11.
24 13 L.P.R.A. § 2201, supp. Note that one of the bases of the Panama Refining
decision was the lack of similar safeguards.
25 4 L.P.R.A. § 35 (Supreme Court); 4 L.P.R.A. § 121 (Superior Courts).
26 Fahey v. Mallonee, supra note 12.
27 Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 398 (1940), which was a
case involving the authority to fx maximum prices when deemed necessary by the
delegate to protect consumers.
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to look to their context, limits the legislature in delegating to other bodies
matters which can be better handled by those bodies. Such limitation is
inconsistent with today's principles of positive government. Courts should
be quite hesitant to overturn legislative determinations of the manner in
which governmental power should be exercised, and should look to all avail-
able factors in an attempt to perceive the adequacy of the standards given.
The legislature is, after all, much closer than the court to limitations on the
legislative process that compel or encourage delegation. Delegation should
not be unduly limited, certainly, where its obvious purpose is to take ad-
vantage of expertise, and where it does not offend the principle of separation
of powers.
Tim Applegate
